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Abstract
Economists have generally ignored the notion that perceived time may di¤er from clock time.
Borrowing from the behavioral psychology literature, we investigate the case of time compression
whereby perceived time passes more quickly than actual time. A framework is presented to
embed time compression in economic models. We then apply the principle to a standard lifecycle
permanent income model with endogenous labor. Time compression provides an alternative
explanation of why older individuals, even those without declining labor productivity, may
choose to reduce their work e¤ort.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we endogenize time. Economists have traditionally treated timeas a deterministic
process that is outside the control of agents. We deviate from this tradition by allowing agents to
make decisions based on the psychological, rather than the actual, passage of time. An agents inner
clock and the actual clock are often out of sync (Flaherty and Meer (1994)). An hour in a dentists
chair can feel like an eternity while a busy day at work can seemingly pass by in an instant. These
perceptions of time can have an important inuence on economic behavior. Economists have long
recognized that beliefs about the future are central in determining economic outcomes (e.g., Keynes
(1936); Friedman (1957)). We extend this principle by allowing beliefs about the passage of time
to alter behavior. In the process, we endogenize time by creating a formal relationship between
perceived and clock time, embed this relationship in a standard economic model and explore the
associated behavioral implications.
Our primary interest is in a phenomenon we call time compression. Time compression refers
to the idea that a persons inner clock may run faster than the actual clock, so for example, one
calendar year may seem to pass in just a few months. A commonly expressed feature of time
compression is that it tends to worsen with age; life speeds up as you get older. An implication
of this phenomenon is that behavioral plans may no longer be time consistent. The lifecycle plans
of a 25 year-old may no longer be optimal when the person reaches age 50 and time seems to be
speeding by. This leads to a number of interesting questions. For instance, how should someone
adjust their allocation of labor and leisure as time begins to speed up and death appears to be
approaching at a faster rate? Does this encourage one to work fewer hours and spend more time
in leisure activities or does it encourage one to work longer hours and build up a nest egg so as to
enjoy future consumption and leisure when time will be speeding by even faster? Are there any
consumption or leisure choices that an agent can make to reverse or mitigate time compression?
These are fascinating questions that we hope to make progress toward answering.
Toward that end, we embed time compression into the standard lifecycle permanent-income
(LCPI) model with endogenous leisure. The standard LCPI individual with constant productivity
and a synchronized internal clock will choose a constant level of work intensity throughout the
lifecycle. Our primary nding is that when time compression worsens with age, individuals increase
work intensity when young and decrease work intensity when old. This e¤ect is much stronger for
individuals that anticipate time compression and build it into current plans, but it is also present
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to a lesser degree for myopic individuals who expect the current degree of time compression to
continue throughout the lifecycle. The results provide a new and provocative explanation of why
older workers choose to retire or scale back work e¤ort.
2 Brief Review of the Research on Time Perception
Time compression is more than just folk theory. There is an impressive amount of scientic and
experimental evidence that subjective and objective time are often out of sync. Here we review
the time-perception literature from the elds of psychology and economics.
2.1 Psychology Literature
Hoagland (1933) was one of the rst to provide evidence of an internal clock, which could be
manipulated by varying body temperature.1 Rammsayer (1997) shows that dopamine activity,
which naturally decreases with age (Volkow et al. (1998)), is positively correlated with the perceived
duration of short spans of time. Therefore, as we age and the dopamine activity in our brains
decreases, we may sense that time is seeming to speed up. In an experimental test of this theory,
Mangan and Bolinskey (1997) developed a counting exercise to test whether the perceived passage
of time varies with age. They found that time does indeed appear to pass at a higher rate as people
grow older. In particular, they found that people in their 20s tended to have synchronized clocks
while those in their 60s systematically underestimated intervals of time. In a similar spirit, Crawley
and Pring (2000) report that time appears to pass more rapidly in middle-aged individuals through
an experiment where individuals of various ages estimate the amount of time that had elapsed since
major past public events. Flaherty and Meer (1994) also reports that middle-aged individuals tend
to perceive that time passes more rapidly. One possible explanation for these results is given by
Chaston and Kingstone (2004), who report that people tend to underestimate the amount of elapsed
time when their attention is engaged. To the extent that individuals accumulate responsibilities
and develop busier schedules as they reach middle age, this may explain the sense that time is
getting compressed.
Philosophers have been studying the nature of time for centuries. In the 4th century A.D.,
Saint Augustine wrote in his Confessions:
1Hoaglands discovery apparently occurred during a trip to the local drugstore for his feverishly ill wife. After
his return from his 20 minute trip, his wife was certain that he had been gone for well over an hour.
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...O Lord, we perceive intervals of times, and we compare them with themselves,
and we say some are longer, others shorter. We even measure by how much shorter or
longer this time may be than that...When, therefore, time is passing, it can be perceived
and measured; but when it has passed, it cannot, since it is not.
In more recent times, William James, the prominent American psychologist, wrote on the notion
of time compression stating that the same space of time seems shorter as we grow older(James
(1892)). James attributes this phenomenon to the fact that in old age one is so accustomed to the
events of life that they no longer leave individual memories.
Psychologists have established several formal theories to explain how we perceive a duration of
time. Ornstein (1969) develops a storage-size model where the perceived duration of an interval
is negatively related to the amount of information available during the interval and the process
involved to encode the information. Thomas and Weaver (1975) develop a processing-time model
to explain the perceived duration of an interval with information content I. Mathematically, the
model assumes that perceived duration of the interval () depends on a timer (f) and a stimulus
processor (g) according to
 = af(t; I) + (1  a)g(I) (1)
where t is the actual duration and a is a weighting parameter. Thomas and Weaver apply their
model to microseconds, but Poynter (1989) states that the basic concepts seem well suited to more
general applications. When an interval has limited stimulus information, a is close to one and
the internal time processor f(t; I) receives the greater weight. For example, when sitting idly at
a stop light, the agent will rely almost exclusively on her inner timer to judge the duration of the
experience. On the other hand, an interval with a great deal of stimulus will correspond to an
a close to zero and most weight placed on the stimulus processor. Michon (1985) describes this
latter situation:
...an exciting holiday or romantic evening have a content I so absorbing that little or
no attention remains for temporal cues (t) that such events might in principle provide.
The resulting immediate judgement therefore tends to severely underestimate the actual
duration.
Finally, the memory-change model states that duration judgements depend on the number of
perceived events during the interval and how memorable they are. James (1892) commented on
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this over 100 years ago, stating in general a time lled with varied and interesting experiences
seems short in passing ... [while] a tract of time empty of experiences seems long in passing.
Several experimental psychology studies have found that lled intervals are perceived to be of
shorter duration than empty ones (e.g., Hicks et al. (1976); Zakay et al. (1983)).
2.2 Economics Literature
The economics literature has largely ignored the di¤erences between perceived and actual time.
When economic agents look into the future to solve dynamic optimization problems they are as-
sumed to accurately perceive how much time will pass between now and a known future event.
However, the evidence cited above suggests that agents often underestimate the amount of time
that elapses between dates, and these misperceptions tend to worsen with age. We are unaware
of a single study that has rigorously examined the behavioral implications of age-dependent time
misperceptions in a modern economic framework.
Lowenstein and Prelec (2003) briey mention the possibility that inner and actual clocks
[may] run at di¤erent speeds. Samuelson (1976) discusses the various possible rules that relate
perceived and actual time (e.g., logarithmic or power rules) and whether the speeding up of time
with ageis a backward-looking or forward-looking phenomenon. In the backward-looking case,
Samuelson postulates that time tends to speed up because of the accumulation of life experiences
and, similar to Eisler (1975), suggests a power function of the form
 = t= (2)
where 0 6=   1. In the forward-looking case, life tends to speed up as one grows older because
the percentage of life remaining diminishes as we grow older. To capture this notion, Samuelson
proposes that perceived time may follow
 =
Z t
0
e0(u)du (3)
where e0(t) represents the average number of days a person of age t expects to live. As a nal
contribution, Samuelson also presents several axioms that in principle lead to testable hypotheses
of the proposed relationships between perceived and actual time.
Ahlbrecht and Weber (1995) use time compression to argue that in many instances hyperbolic
discounting can be used in prescriptive theory. They show that a concave time-perception function
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with standard exponential discounting will lead to a preference structure observationally equivalent
to hyperbolic discounting. Ahlbrecht and Weber therefore claim that hyperbolic discount func-
tions are not arbitrary but are founded on sound principles of rationality. In a similar spirit,
several recent studies (i.e., Takahashi (2005); Takahashi (2009); Zauberman et al. (2009); Kim and
Zauberman (2009)) conclude that nonlinear time compression can explain hyperbolic discounting
behavior.
2.3 Limitations of the Previous Literature
One limitation of the literature above, particularly that from psychology, is that it often focuses
on short durations in retrospect. For our purposes, we are more interested in forward-looking
durations of much longer intervals. A second limitation of the literature on time perception is
that it provides only a few concrete relationships between perceived and clock time that can be
directly applied to analytical models. Compiling information from over 100 experimental studies,
Eisler (1975) suggests a power function  = atb for the relationship between actual time (t) and
perceived time (), where 0:5  b  1. Kim and Zauberman (2009) also use a power function,
calling a the time-contraction parameter and b the sensitivity-to-time parameter. Michon (1985)
states that longer intervals (>20 s) may be represented proportional to the square root of physical
time(i.e., b = 0:5). But he goes on to state that at the upper end, beyond 20 s most adults will
by and large, but not always, linearize their time scales with the help of clocks and calendars and
with a great deal of experience in linearizing time. Macar (1985) and Takahashi (2005) rely on
Webers Law (i.e., the just noticeable di¤erence in a stimulus is a constant proportion of the original
stimulus) to suggest a logarithmic relationship  = a ln(t). Cohen (1967) develops an experiment
where subjects mark various points on a time line representing their lifecycle. He nds evidence
for a logarithmic scale (back to 12 months) and linear thereafter. Cohen also mentions that future
perceived time intervals may be represented on a logarithmic scale. In a similar experiment,
Zauberman et al. (2009) also nd evidence of logarithmic time compression. Campbell (1990)
summarizes the experimental studies on the perceived duration of elapsed time. Nearly all studies
nd that time is compressed with a typical subjective hour lasting between 1.08 and 1.47 objective
hours, or ipping this around, one objective hour is perceived to last somewhere between 40 to 55
minutes.
In sum, there exists both scientic and anecdotal evidence that perceived time not only di¤ers
from clock time, but it seems to speed up as we get older. The implications for economic theory
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are both intriguing and relatively untested.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a formal characterization
of time compression, embeds it into an agents dynamic optimization problem, and distinguishes
it from standard notions of discounting. Sections 3 applies time compression to the life-cycle
consumption/leisure problem. Section 4 summarizes our ndings and discusses possible future
research.
3 Economic Framework for Perceived and Clock Time
In this section, we formally dene time compression and present an analytical framework that
captures the relationship between perceived and actual time. Start by considering an agent who is
standing at any time period t0 2 [0; T ]. The agent chooses a planned path for the control variable
x(t) over the interval t 2 [t0; T ] in order to maximizeZ T
t=t0
F ()  u (x(t)) dt (4)
where F () is the discount function;  = t   t0 is the planning horizon;  is the time-perception
parameter; and u (x(t)) is the utility function with derivatives u0  0 and u00  0. The optimal plan
involves maximizing (4) by choosing x(t) for all t 2 [t0; T ] subject to standard dynamic constraints,
initial conditions, and endpoint conditions.
The parameter  > 0 acts as a scale parameter for durations of time.2 If  = 1, the agents
inner and actual clocks are synchronized and the perceived distance of any future date equals the
actual distance. If  6= 1, then perceived and clock time are asynchronized. This leads to our
denition of time compression (and time expansion):
Denition 1 An agent experiences time compression (expansion) if  < (>)1.
Our primary focus is on time compression but the framework is su¢ ciently general to allow for
time expansion. The denition above is moot about the change in time compression through the
lifecycle. To capture the notion that time speeds up as you get older, we allow the time-perception
parameter  to be age-dependent:  = (t0).
2The studies reviewed above generally treat  as the perceived duration of the interval  = t  t0, where t0 = 0.
We instead treat  as a scale parameter such that  is the perceived length of .
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Denition 2 An agent experiences age-increasing time compression if  0(t0) < 0 for any t0
2 [0; T ].
Although time compression will alter behavior, if time compression stays constant through
the lifecycle (i.e.,  0(t0) = 0), there will be no incentive to deviate from the original plan; the
original plan will be time consistent. Age-dependent time compression, however, will produce time
inconsistent plans because future events will appear to be approaching at di¤ering rates across the
lifecycle and will alter relative intertemporal tradeo¤s.
Next, we turn to a discussion of the relationship between time compression and discounting.
3.1 Time Compression and Discounting
Time compression causes future dates to be perceived as closer than they actually are. As a result,
the future will not be discounted as heavily, and all else equal, time compression will encourage
long-term planning and a greater concern for the future. To better understand these e¤ects, we
consider how time compression interacts with standard notions of discounting. The choice of time
perception can produce exponential, hyperbolic or age-dependent discounting as special cases.
Recall, the discount rate is dened by
r() =
 F 0()
F ()
: (5)
The two most common discount functions are exponential and hyperbolic. The exponential
discount function
F () = exp( ) (6)
produces a time-invariant discount rate r() =  and time-consistent optimal plans (Strotz (1956)).
To better match experimental data, researchers have recently begun to use a hyperbolic discount
function (Ainslie and Haslam (2003)):
F () = (1 + ) =: (7)
When  tends to zero, F () approaches the exponential function so that exponential discounting
can be thought of as a limiting case of hyperbolic discounting. An important feature of hyperbolic
discounting is that the discount rate r() = =(1 + ) is decreasing in , producing time
inconsistent optimal plans and preference reversals (Lowenstein and Prelec (1992)). Figure 1
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shows the standard discount functions with and without time compression. Hyperbolic discount
curves have a present-period bias relative to exponential discounting; they are relatively steeper
in the near future and atter in the distant future. The discount functions with constant time
compression are everywhere higher (i.e., less discounting) because future time periods are perceived
to be closer.
As Ahlbrecht and Weber (1995) point out, hyperbolic discounting is observationally equivalent
to exponential discounting with time compression of the following form:3
() =
ln(1 + )

: (8)
In this case, an individual discounts the future exponentially but perceives future dates to be
increasingly less distant than they are in actual clock time. Therefore, time compression is capable
of producing the same notions such as regret, procrastination, and self control that accompany time-
inconsistent preferences. However, our specication of age-dependent time compression, (t0), is
also capable of matching evidence that impatience and discount rates tend to decline with age
(Green et al. (1999)).
We now turn to specic functional forms for the time compression parameter  .
3.2 Specications for Time Compression
We consider two di¤erent types of time compression: exogenous, age-dependent time compression
( = x) and endogenous, choice-based time compression ( = y). Tien and Burnes (2002) classify
the distinction as nature (due to the changing levels of dopamine in the brain) versus nurture (due
to the set of experiences we have accumulated over our lifetime). Exogenous, age-dependent time
compression is modeled as
x =

1  t0
T

(9)
where  2 [0; 1] controls the speed at which time compression occurs through the lifecycle and
 2 [0;1) captures the curvature of the relationship. Time compression is treated as an inherent
part of an agents preference structure, similar to diminishing marginal utility, impatience, or
aversion to risk. When  = 0, perceived time and clock time are perfectly synchronized and
x = 1 for any t0. A positive value for  indicates that as the agent ages and t0 increases, dates of
3This can be veried by substituting (8) into F () = exp( ):
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xed distance in the future are perceived to be getting closer and closer time is getting increasingly
compressed. When  is between zero and one, time compression is a concave function of the aging
process; when  = 1 it is a linear function; and when  is greater than one, time compression is a
convex function of the aging process. Figure 2 shows how age-dependent time compression impacts
the perceived distance of a xed 10-year horizon.
One interpretation of t0=T in (9) is that it represents the inventory of experiences the agent has
accumulated over the lifecycle (Cottle (1976); Tien and Burnes (2002)). The term t0=T measures
the fraction of the agents lifecycle that is complete. When t0=T is near zero and the agent is
young, each experience is relatively new and is perceived to have a longer duration. As the agent
becomes older, t0=T increases and the inventory of experiences grows. Each new experience then
contributes less to the inventory, is less memorable and appears to pass by more rapidly. Equation
(9) could loosely be interpreted as Webers law applied to time perception the perceived length
of an interval of time is proportional to number of intervals experienced.
Under the exogenous specication, time compression is an unavoidable part of the aging process.
However, recent research in the eld of social psychology suggests that agents can make conscious
decisions to adjust their internal clocks (Flaherty (2003)). Following Flaherty (2003), we link
perceptions regarding the passage of time to the intensity of an individuals actions, denoted as
I(t) 2 [0; 1]. When an individual is completely engaged in an activity, I(t) is near one. Examples
include participation in competitive sports, late night cramming for a college exam, or Samuelsons
(1972) description of Galois feverish attempt to transcribe his nal scientic contributions the
night before a hopeless duel. Conversely, sitting idle at a stop light, an afternoon in a dentists
chair, or waiting in a long line at a department store stretch out perceived time. To capture these
features, we specify endogenous time compression as follows:
y(t) = exp[ I(t)]: (10)
Increased intensity therefore causes a reduction in the time-perception parameter and an acceler-
ation of perceived time:
@y(t)
@I(t)
=   exp[ I(t)] =  y(t) < 0; (11)
where  > 0.
An intriguing possibility is that an individual experiences both exogenous and endogenous time
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compression. For example, time compression might be a geometric average of the two types:
 = x
1 
y ; (12)
where 0    1 is a weighting parameter that measures the degree to which time compression is
exogenous or endogenous. When  = 1, time compression is entirely exogenous and only dependent
on the agents position in the lifecycle. When  = 0, time compression is entirely endogenous and
only dependent on the agents chosen intensity level. When  is between zero and one, we get the
case where the aging process naturally increases the degree of time compression, but the agent can
make conscious decisions to decrease her intensity level to o¤set the e¤ect.
3.3 Anticipating Time Compression
An important issue is whether agents anticipate time compression. We consider two cases for
the anticipation of time compression, following the literature on time-inconsistent preferences (e.g.,
Pollack (1968)). In the rst, agents expect the current degree of time compression to continue for
the remainder of the lifecycle. This is the case of naïveté, in which
E[(t)] = (t0) (13)
for all t 2 [t0; T ]. Time compression is thought to continue at its current rate for the remainder of
the lifecycle.
In the second, agents are sophisticated, correctly anticipating the entire path of time compres-
sion and the implied self-control problems (ODonoghue and Rabin (1999)). Expectation of the
exogenous component of time compression is known with certainty and always correctly predicted.
When making future plans, agents use
E[x(t)] =

1   t
T

(14)
for all t 2 [t0; T ]. For the endogenous component, agents similarly use
E[y(t)] = exp[ I(t)] (15)
for all t 2 [t0; T ]. Although the degree of future time compression is known, the individual
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will still face a time-consistency problem. Even well-intentioned plans made today will not be
consistent with the incentives faced by future selves. We apply this framework to the classic
life-cycle consumption problem with leisure to formally investigate the behavioral impacts of time
compression.
4 Application. Lifecycle Consumption/Leisure Planning
Consider a representative agent faced with the classic control problem introduced by (Modigliani
and Brumberg (1954)) modied to include endogenous labor supply, h(t) (Heckman (1976)). The
agent enters the workforce at t = 0 and passes away at date t = T , which is exogenous and
certain. In our model, the labor supply decision is not one of choosing hours, but rather choosing
the intensity level, I(t) 2 [0; 1], of the h hours spent at work. The product of the two, h(t) =
I(t)h, determines e¤ective labor supply. The chosen intensity level also inuences  , creating a
tension between higher labor productivity and time compression. Our focus on labor intensity (or
e¤ort) rather than labor hours is similar to the e¢ ciency-wage literature (e.g., Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984); Akerlof and Yellen (1990)), but we abstract from concepts such as shirking and asymmetric
information. Labor intensity has also been modeled by Filer (1987), Fairris and Alston (1994),
Saez (2002), and Green (2004).4
The total time endowment is normalized to one so that hours at work, h, and hours in leisure,
l, sum to one. E¤ective leisure, l(t) = 1   h(t), is the sum of time away from work, l, and
unproductive time at work, (1   I(t))h (Butler (2001)). The agent receives wage income at rate
w, with total income equal to w  h(t). Although we only consider interior solutions and do not
explicitly model retirement, individuals may rationally scale back the intensity of their work e¤ort
as they age. Because the properties of the basic lifecycle model are well understood, the e¤ects of
time compression on the agents choice will be transparent.
4.1 Optimal Control Solution with Age-Independent Time Compression
Begin with the classic control problem where time compression does not vary with age (i.e.,  0(t0) =
0). The optimal plan is time consistent and will serve as a benchmark for later analysis with age-
4 In our framework, the endogenous time compression parameter, y, depends negatively on the chosen intensity
level, I(t). This is consistent with the psychological literature on perceived time (e.g., Chaston and Kingstone (2004);
Hicks et al. (1976); Zakay et al. (1983)). However, since there exists a one-to-one mapping between I(t) and either
e¤ective labor h(t) or e¤ective leisure l(t), one can equivalently think of time compression as occurring because of
either higher levels of e¤ective labor or lower levels of e¤ective leisure.
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dependent time compression. The representative agent solves the following control problem:
max
fc(t);I(t)g
Z T
t=t0
e (t t0)u (c(t); l(t)) dt (16)
for t0 2 [0; T ] subject to (12) and
_k(t) = rk(t) + wh(t)  c(t) (17)
k(0) = k(T ) = 0 (18)
where  is the discount rate; c(t) is consumption; k(t) is the stock of assets; h(t) = hI(t) is e¤ective
labor supply; w is the wage rate; and r is the real rate of return on savings. The utility function, u,
is positively related to c(t) and l(t) with the standard curvature properties to ensure a well-behaved,
interior solution.
Individuals make optimal consumption c(t) and e¤ective labor h(t) plans. The present-value
Hamiltonian is
H = e (t t0)u (c(t); l(t)) + k(t)[rk(t) + wh(t)  c(t)] (19)
where k(t) is the shadow price of capital. The necessary conditions from the maximum principle
are
@H
@c(t)
= e (t t0)uc (c(t); l(t)) = k(t) (20)
@H
@I(t)
= e (t t0)ul (c(t); l(t))
@l(t)
@I(t)
=  k(t)w@h(t)
@I(t)
(21)
_k(t) =  k(t)r: (22)
We assume a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function:
u (c(t); l(t)) =

c(t)l(t)(1 )
1 
1   ; (23)
where  is the weight between consumption and e¤ective leisure and 1= is the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution of the consumption-leisure bundle. Combining equations (20), (21) and
(22) produces:
c(t) =

1  wl(t); (24)
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the standard optimal relationship between c(t) and l(t) in a neoclassical consumption model with
endogenous leisure (Butler (2001)). The planned lifecycle paths for c(t) and l(t) are given by
_c(t)
c(t)
=
_l(t)
l(t)
=
1

(r   ): (25)
It is clear from (25) that the solution is equivalent to the classic solution with a scaled discount
rate, ~ =  . However, with the introduction of age-dependent time compression, (t0), the
optimal plan is no longer time consistent. As is standard in the literature on time-inconsistent
preferences and self-control problems, we consider two solution criteria. In the rst, the individual
fails to anticipate future changes in time compression exogenous or endogenous and believes that
the current rate of time compression will continue through the remainder of the lifecycle. In the
second, we assume the individual fully anticipates future changes in the rate of time compression
and acknowledges the inherent self-control problems. Following Laibson (1997), the sophisticated
agent solves for a subgame perfect Markov equilibrium with her future selves.
4.2 Solution Concepts with Age-Dependent Time Compression
We now consider the case where time compression worsens with age,  0(t0) < 0. The degree of time
compression varies exogenously with age due to the accumulation of lifetime experiences described
by James (1892) and Samuelson (1976). However, time compression also varies endogenously with
the intensity level, I(t), of ones activities (Hicks et al. (1976)). To integrate endogenous time
compression within the standard lifecycle model, we assume that the intensity of an individuals
activities at work determine the perceived speed of time.
4.2.1 Naïve Solution
The naïve individual assumes that (t) = x(t0)y(I(t0))1  for t 2 [t0; T ], which is expressed as
 for simplicity. Time compression makes future dates appear closer so that the e¤ective discount
rate is  . However, as the individual moves through the lifecycle, the degree of time compression
continually gets updated. The naïve individual reacts to the new degree of time compression and
expects it to continue, but he does not anticipate future changes in the rate of time compression.
Actual consumption and e¤ective leisure paths are then given by the envelope of all the initial values
from the lifecycle planned paths (Caliendo and Aadland (2007)) as described in the age-independent
time compression case.
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4.2.2 Sophisticated Equilibrium
To make the sophisticated case operational, consider a single representative agent that lives for
T +1 discrete periods: f0; 1; 2; :::; Tg. The subgame perfect time-consistent plan involves choosing
a consumption-labor intensity path fc(t); I(t)gTt=t0 that maximizes
PT
t=t0
e (t t0)(t)u (c(t); l(t)) ; (26)
for t0 2 [0; T ] while taking into account the law of motion for the asset
k(t+ 1) = (1 + r)k(t) + w(1  l(t))  c(t); (27)
relationship between e¤ective leisure and labor intensity
l(t) = 1  I(t)h; (28)
the time-compression parameter
(t) = x(t)
y(I(t))
1 ; (29)
the optimal choices of all future selves c(t) = c(k(t); t), l(t) = l(k(t); t) and k(0) = k(T + 1) = 0.
The average time-compression parameter over the interval (t0; t) is given by
(t0; t) =
1
(t  t0)
Xt
s=t0+1
(s): (30)
Extending Pollack (1968) to include capital accumulation and leisure, the equilibrium conditions
are
uc(t) =
XT
s=t+1
e (t;s)(s t)
Qs
j=t+2
@k(j)
@k(j   1)


uc(s)
@c(k(s); s)
@k(s)
+

ul(s)  (s)@(s)
@I(s)
@I(s)
@l(s)

@l(k(s); s)
@k(s)

; (31)
ul(t) = wuc(t); (32)
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for t = t0; :::; T   1 and
c(T ) = c(k(T ); T ) = (1 + r)k(T ) + w(1  l(T )) (33)
ul(T ) = wuc(T ); (34)
where (s) =
PT
j=s e
 [(t;j)(j t) (t;s)(s t)]u(j). The problem can be solved via backward induc-
tion starting at period T .
To clarify, consider a simple example similar to the one presented in Pollack (1968) where
e¤ective labor is supplied inelastically (i.e., h(t) = 1 for all t) and T = 2. The optimal choice for
period 2 self is
c(2) = c(k(2); 2) = (1 + r)k(2) + w: (35)
Given k(1), period 1 self then chooses c(1) to maximize
u (c(1)) + e (1;2)u (c((1 + r)k(1) + w   c(1); 2)) (36)
given how self 2 will respond to the consumption choice of self 1. The rst-order condition is
uc (1) = e
 (1;2)uc (2) (1 + r): (37)
Finally, given k(0) = 0 and anticipating how self 1 and self 2 will behave (i.e., c(k(1); 1) and
c(k(2); 2)), self 0 then chooses c(0) to maximize
u (c(0)) +
e (0;1)u (c(w   c(0); 1)) +
e 2(0;2)u (c((1 + r)(w   c(0)) + w   c(w   c(0); 1); 2)) : (38)
The rst-order condition is
uc (0) = e
 (0;1)uc (1)
@c(1)
@k(1)
+ e 2(0;2)uc (2)
@c(2)
@k(2)
@k(2)
@k(1)
: (39)
Together, the optimal choices from (35), (37), and (39) produce a time-consistent consumption
path that accounts for the intertemporal conict faced by a sophisticated individual experiencing
age-dependent time compression.
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4.3 Parameters and Simulation Results
In this section we discuss the chosen parameter values and the simulation results for three cases:
(1) no time compression, (2) equally weighted exogenous and endogenous naïve time compression,
and (3) equally weighted exogenous and endogenous sophisticated time compression.
4.3.1 Parameter Values
The parameter values are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Annual Parameter Values
Parameters k(0) T ; r ; h;  w   ; 
Value 0 60 0:04 0:5 5 0:33 3 1
Individuals begin at t = 0 (age 20) with no capital and live for T = 60 years (age 80). The
discount and interest rates are set equal ( = r) so the baseline lifecycle planner with exponential
discounting will choose at consumption and leisure proles and will not accumulate capital. As a
result, any observed capital accumulation will be solely due to time compression. The exogenous
component of time compression is linear in age ( = 1) and progresses at a rate such that x(T ) =
0:5. The wage rate per e¤ective hour worked is w = 5. The hours worked parameter is h = 0:5
so that an individual choosing maximum work intensity (i.e., I(t) = 1) is working the equivalent of
half the available hours or 12 hours per day. The weight between consumption and e¤ective leisure
is  = 0:33, which implies that synchronized individuals will choose e¤ective labor equal to one
third the available hours or 8 hours per day. The curvature parameter in utility is  = 3 leading to
an intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1= = 0:33 for the composite leisure-consumption good.
The endogenous time compression parameter is  = 1. The endogenous component for naïve time
compression is normalized so that y(0) = 1 and the individuals internal clock is synchronized
at age 20.5 Finally, with  = 0:5, time compression is equally divided between exogenous and
endogenous parts.
5The normalization is accomplished by modifying the endogenous component of time compression to be
y(t) = exp ( (I(t)  I(0))) :
The normalization value for naïve individuals is also applied to sophisticated individuals so the two types will
experience equal degrees of time compression for the same choice of labor intensity.
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4.3.2 Simulation Results and Discussion
The results of the simulations are shown in Figures 3 and 4. For the baseline agent with a
synchronized clock ( = 1), the chosen labor intensity is I = 1    = 0:67 so that approximately
two-thirds of the 12 working hours are spent concentrating on job-related tasks. The model does
not identify whether the agent (i) exerts two-thirds e¤ort throughout the day, (ii) exerts full e¤ort
for two-thirds of the working hours and no e¤ort for the remainder, or (iii) chooses some mix of
the two. The important point is that the synchronized agent is e¤ectively putting in 8 hours of
work per day.
Next, consider the naïve agent. At the beginning of the lifecycle (age 20), the naïve agent
has a synchronized internal clock and expects no future time compression. The initial choice is
therefore the same as the synchronized agent. In the following year (age 21), the individual begins
to experience a small amount of time compression, which she expects to persist throughout the rest
of the lifecycle. In terms of planning, the e¤ective discount rate for future years is now slightly
smaller because perceived time has sped up. The optimal response shown in Figure 3 is to work
harder and begin to save for later years, as the rate of return on saving is now higher than the
perceived discount rate. The increased work intensity combines with exogenous time compression
to speed up perceived time even further. This pattern continues until about age 50 when the naïve
agent starts to reduce work intensity relative to the baseline synchronized agent. Between ages 50
and 80, the naïve agent gradually reduces work intensity to slow down time compression, increases
e¤ective leisure, and consumes the wealth accumulated from labor e¤ort when young. The observed
path for the naïve agent is time inconsistent future plans are not realized and continually reset.
As shown by Caliendo and Aadland (2007), the observed path for the naïve agent is the envelope
of all initial values from the continuum of revised plans.
The sophisticated agent is the antithesis of the naïve agent. While the naïve agent continually
underestimates the degree of future time compression, the sophisticated agent perfectly anticipates
time compression and recognizes the internal conict with future selves. In response, the sophis-
ticated agent solves for the time-consistent subgame perfect equilibrium path (Laibson (1997)).
Figures 3 and 4 show the path for labor intensity and the resulting degree of time compression.
Labor intensity begins substantially higher than the naïve or synchronized case, allowing for sig-
nicant asset accumulation early in the lifecycle but also contributing to time compression. As
shown in Figure 4, the sophisticated agent experiences immediate time compression because she
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chooses a relatively high degree of labor intensity. Labor intensity then falls throughout the life-
cycle in order to mitigate naturally occurring time compression. In the nal years of the lifecycle,
the sophisticated agent is supplying only one third of the e¤ective labor as at age 20, successfully
smoothing time compression and nancing a signicant portion of consumption from early asset
accumulation.
One of most robust trends in labor economics over the last century is the steady decline in
retirement age (Costa (1998)). Many explanations have been o¤ered: rising incomes, improving
health, introduction of social security, etc. We o¤er a new possible explanation. Older workers
may intentionally take more leisure to slow down the passage of perceived time. While 20th century
technological advance has certainly elevated incomes and standards of living, it has also led to an
accelerated pace of life (Gleick (1999); Wajcman (2008)) and an increasing sense that time is ying
by. To o¤set this e¤ect, those most sharply a¤ected by this phenomenon may choose to reduce
labor intensity with the purpose of slowing down their subjective clocks.
5 Conclusion
Building on extensive prior research documenting a widespread discrepancy between clock time
and perceived time, we explore the behavioral implications of that discrepancy. We show that,
when people base their choices on perceived time, the outcomes mimic some empirically observed
patterns. Thus, time compression is not only a psychological phenomenon but also can drive
economic behavior.
When time compression increases with age, a formal lifecycle permanent-income model predicts
that individuals will choose to work harder when young than when old, particularly if the individual
correctly anticipates the future pattern of perception. In comparison with our theoretical predic-
tions, empirical patterns of work-leisure choices might suggest signicant individual heterogeneity
with respect to the degree and anticipation of time compression. Measuring this heterogeneity and
accounting for it in formal lifecycle models of consumption and labor choices remains an open area
for further research.
Because time compression alters the rate at which individuals discount the future, many prob-
lems of collective choice are likely to be a¤ected by time compression. Policies addressing in-
tertemporal problems such as climate change, depletable resources, pollution, and investment in
infrastructure necessarily embody implicit discount rates. The endogeneity of individual discount
19
rates due to time compression thus complicates the challenge of matching social policies to appro-
priate aggregations of individualspreferences. A related implication is that demographic trends
such as a baby boom will alter the (weighted or unweighted) average discount rate across individ-
uals over time. Hence, the e¤ects of time compression on optimal public policy is another broad
and untapped area of future research.
References
Ahlbrecht, Martin and Martin Weber (1995). Hyperbolic discounting models in prescriptive theory
of intertemporal choice. Zeitschrift fur Wirtschafts- u. Sozialwissenschaften 115, 535568.
Ainslie, George and Nick Haslam (2003). Choice over Time. Chap. Hyperbolic Discounting, pp. 57
92. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Akerlof, G.A. and J.L. Yellen (1990). The fair wage-e¤ort hypothesis and unemployment. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 105(2), 255283.
Butler, Monika (2001). Neoclassical lifecycle consumption: A textbook example. Economic Theory
17, 209221.
Caliendo, Frank and David Aadland (2007). Short-term planning and the life-cycle consumption
puzzle. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 31(4), 13921415.
Campbell, Scott S. (1990). Cognitive Models of Psychological Time. Chap. Circadian Rhythms and
Human Temporal Experience, pp. 101118. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Hillsdale NJ.
Chaston, Anthony and Alan Kingstone (2004). Time estimation: The e¤ect of cortically mediated
attention. Brain and Cognition 55, 286289.
Cohen, John (1967). Psychological Time in Health and Disease. Charles C. Thomas Publishing.
Springeld IL.
Costa, D.L. (1998). The evolution of retirement: an American economic history, 1880-1990. Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
Cottle, Thomas J. (1976). Perceiving Time: A Psychological Investigation with Men and Women.
John Wiley and Sons.
20
Crawley, Susan and Linda Pring (2000). When did mrs. thatcher resign? the e¤ects of ageing on
the dating of public events. Memory 8, 111121.
Eisler, Hannes (1975). Subjective duration and psycophysics. Psychological Review 82(6), 429450.
Fairris, D. and L.J. Alston (1994). Wages and the Intensity of Labor E¤ort: E¢ ciency Wages versus
Compensating Payments.. Southern Economic Journal 61(1), 149160.
Filer, R.K. (1987). Joint estimates of the supply of labor hours and the intensity of work e¤ort.
Journal of Behavioral Economics 16(3), 112.
Flaherty, Michael G. (2003). Time work: Customizing temporal experience. Social Psychology Quar-
terly 66(1), 1733.
Flaherty, Michael G. and Michelle D. Meer (1994). How time ies: Age, memory, and temporal
compression. The Sociological Quarterly 35(4), 705721.
Friedman, Milton (1957). A theory of the consumption function. Princeton University Press. New
Jersey.
Gleick, J. (1999). Faster: The acceleration of just about everything. Pantheon Books. New York.
Green, F. (2004). Why has work e¤ort become more intense?. Industrial Relations: A Journal of
Economy and Society 43(4), 709741.
Green, L., J. Myerson and P. Ostaszewski (1999). Discounting of delayed rewards across the life
span: Age di¤erences in individual discounting functions. Behavioural Processes 46(1), 8996.
Heckman, J.J. (1976). A life-cycle model of earnings, learning and consumption. Journal of Political
Economy 84(4), S11S44.
Hicks, R.E., G.W. Miller and M. Kinsbourne (1976). Prospective and retrospective judgements
of time as a function of amount of information processed. American Journal of Psychology
89, 719730.
Hoagland, Hudson (1933). The physiological control of judgements of duration: evidence for a
chemical clock. Journal of General Psychology 9, 267287.
James, William (1892). Psychology: Briefer Course. Henry Holt. New York.
21
Keynes, John Maynard (1936). The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. MacMil-
lan. London.
Kim, B.K. and G. Zauberman (2009). Perception of anticipatory time in temporal discounting.
Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics 2(2), 91101.
Laibson, D. (1997). Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting. Quarterly Journal of Economics
112(2), 443477.
Lowenstein, G. and D. Prelec (1992). Anomalies in intertemporal choice: Evidence and interpreta-
tion. Quarterly Journal of Economics 57, 573598.
Lowenstein, Geroge and Drazen Prelec (2003). Choice over Time. Chap. Anomalies in Intertemporal
Choice: Evidence and an Interpretation, pp. 119145. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Macar, F. (1985). Time, Mind and Behavior. Chap. Time Psychophysics and related models,
pp. 112130. Springer-Verlag. New York.
Mangan, Peter and P. Bolinskey (1997). Undersestimation of time during normal aging: The result
of the slowing of a dopaminergic regulated internal clock?. Paper presented at the Annual
Meeting of the Society for Neuroscience.
Michon, J.A. (1985). Time, Mind and Behavior. Chap. The Compleat Time Experiencer, pp. 2052.
Springer-Verlag. New York.
Modigliani, Franco and Richard Brumberg (1954). Post-Keynesian Economics. Chap. Utility Analy-
sis and Consumption Function: An Interpretation of Cross Section Data. Rutgers University
Press.
ODonoghue, Ted and Matthew Rabin (1999). Doing it now or later. American Economic Review
89, 103124.
Ornstein, R. E. (1969). On the Experience of Time. Penguin Books. Middlesex, England.
Pollack, R. A. (1968). Consistent planning. Review of Economic Studies 35(2), 201208.
Poynter, Douglas (1989). Time and Human Cognition: A Life-Span Perspective. Chap. Judging
the Duration of Time Intervals: A Process of Remembering Segments of Experience. Elsevier
Science Publishers: North Holland.
22
Rammsayer, Thomas H. (1997). E¤ects of body core temperature and brain dopamine activity on
timing process in humans. Biological Psychology 46, 169192.
Saez, E. (2002). Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive Versus Extensive Labor Supply
Responses. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(3), 10391073.
Samuelson, Paul A. (1976). Welfare and Time in Economics: Essays in Honor of Nicholas
Gerogescu-Roegen. Chap. Speeding Up of Time with Age in Recognition of Life as Fleeting,
pp. 153168. Lexington Books: Lexington, MA.
Shapiro, C. and J.E. Stiglitz (1984). Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device. The
American Economic Review 74(3), 433444.
Strotz, R. H. (1956). Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility maximizaton. Review of Economic
Studies 23(3), 165180.
Takahashi, T. (2005). Loss of self-control in intertemporal choice may be attributable to logarithmic
time-perception. Medical hypotheses 65(4), 691693.
Takahashi, T. (2009). Theoretical frameworks for neuroeconomics of intertemporal choice. Journal
of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics 2(2), 7590.
Thomas, Ewart C. and Wanda B. Weaver (1975). Cognitive processing and time perception. Per-
ception and Psychophysics 17(4), 363367.
Tien, James M. and James P. Burnes (2002). On the perception of time: Experiential impact. IEEE
Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics Part A: Systems and Humans 32(6), 768
773.
Volkow, Nora D., Ruben C. Gur, Gene-Jack Wang, Joanna S. Fowler, Paul J. Moberg, Yu-Shin
Ding, Robert Hitzemann, Gwenn Smith and Jean Logan (1998). Association between decline in
brain dopamine activity with age and cognitive and motor impairment in healthy individuals.
American Journal of Psychiatry 155, 344349.
Wajcman, J. (2008). Life in the fast lane? Towards a sociology of technology and time. British
Journal of Sociology 59(1), 5977.
Zakay, Dan, Devora Nitzan and Joseph Glicksohn (1983). The inuence of task di¢ culty and
external tempo on subjective time estimation. Perception and Psychophysics 34(5), 451456.
23
Zauberman, G., B.K. Kim, S.A. Malkoc and J.R. Bettman (2009). Discounting time and time
discounting: Subjective time perception and intertemporal preferences. Journal of Marketing
Research 46(4), 543556.
24
Figure 1. Discount Functions and Age-Independent Time Compression 
 
Notes.  The exponential discount function is 𝐹 = exp(−𝜌𝜏∆) and the hyperbolic discount function is 𝐹 = 1/(1 + 𝛼𝜏∆)𝜌/𝛼 .  The parameters 
are set at ρ = 0.05 and α = 0.25.  The time compression parameter is set at τ = 1 for no time compression and τ = 0.5 with time compression. 
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Notes.  Age-dependent time compression is given by 𝜏 𝑡0 =  1− 𝑡0/𝑇 
𝛽 .  The perceived planning horizon is 𝜏Δ, where Δ = 10.   
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Notes.  Effective labor is given by ℎ 𝑡 = 𝐼(𝑡)ℎ, where 𝐼(𝑡) is labor intensity.  The parameter values for the simulation are shown in Table 1.  
The simulations for the sophisticated agent are linearized approximations to the equilibrium conditions (i.e., equations (31) and (32)) at five-
year intervals.  The points of approximation are calculated sequentially.  In the first round, the points of approximation for 𝑐(𝑡) and 𝑘 𝑡  are 
set at the baseline values for the synchronized agent.  In the second round, the realized paths for 𝑐(𝑡) and 𝑘 𝑡  from round one are used as the 
revised points of approximation. 
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Notes.  The time compression parameter, 𝜏, for the synchronized, naïve and sophisticated agents includes both exogenous and endogenous 
components, 𝜏 = 𝜏𝑥
𝛼𝜏𝑦
1−𝛼 .  The exogenous component is given by 𝜏𝑥 = 1− 0.5(𝑡0/𝑇).  The simulations for the sophisticated agent are 
linearized approximations to the equilibrium conditions (i.e., equations (31) and (32)) at five-year intervals.  The points of approximation are 
calculated sequentially.  In the first round, the points of approximation for 𝑐(𝑡) and 𝑘 𝑡  are set at the baseline values for the synchronized 
agent.  In the second round, the realized paths for 𝑐(𝑡) and 𝑘 𝑡  from round one are used as the revised points of approximation. 
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